Chapter One

Introduction:
Taking Entertainment Seriously

Terry Nichols Clark

This paperback edition deletes a few chapters from the hardback edition, and adds a new chapter on Scenes.

This volume analyzes how consumption and entertainment relate to politics and urban development. People both live and work in cities. And where they choose to live shifts where and how they work. This volume, as the last sentence suggests, explores reversing the causal processes normally assumed to drive cities.

Amenities enter here as new public concerns for many cities in the U.S. and much of Northern Europe. Old ways of thinking, old paradigms—such as “land, labor, capital, and management generate economic development”—are too simple. The developers’ classic “location, location, location” is similarly incomplete—location near what? This new, barely charted terrain is critical for policy makers. Urban public officials, business, and non-profit leaders are using culture, entertainment, and urban amenities to (seek to) enhance their locations—for present and future residents, tourists, conventioneers, and shoppers. They are making multi-billion dollar investments in amenities, hoping that these are sound investments. New York and Chicago now report that their first or second largest industrial sector is entertainment or culture. The world’s largest industry is tourism, by some counts (reports differ with assumptions about what comprises tourism) (Molotch, in press).

What do we know about these issues, to help codify such policies? What is the current knowledge base and how can we extend it? This book joins work on these concerns from creative thinking in economics, sociology, political science, public policy, geography, and related fields. Many ideas below challenge the
established urban wisdom. The most important single challenge is the emphasis in each chapter on consumption, amenities, and culture as drivers of urban policy. There is considerable evidence below about how these drive people to move to or from different cities and regions, and how they are especially critical in attracting innovative persons—the creative class people that Florida (2002) stresses as catalysts in making the modern economy and high tech hum.

Too much past work treated entertainment as trivia or fluff, not real business. Further, among many moralistic observers, entertainment is immoral. Among many leftist observers, it is also counter revolutionary, an opium for the people that should be fought. This is now all changing, gradually, but we still have precious little serious analysis of culture, entertainment, and amenity-related phenomena. Researchers far more often study work, the disadvantaged, or socially deviant. Can these fields learn from what is below? We think so.

What is our focus? Entertainment, consumption, and amenities as they relate to politics and urban development. These distinct concepts are explored below. But the book's bigger message is that all these contrast with the more common assumption: work and production drive life and give it meaning. This common assumption informs the materialist view that “money talks,” or the Marxist emphasis on relations to the means of production, or the psychological view (of Maslow or Inglehart) that basic wants are hierarchically ordered, with work and production at the top. Did the end of the Dot-Com boom or terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001 bring the end of consumption? Even among those committed to a totally materialist world view, a time of economic turbulence and cutbacks means disruptive changes for people’s consumption patterns, implying possible jealousy and invidious comparisons with others who are seen as engaging in overly conspicuous consumption, plus resentment toward bankers or global forces or political leaders that may have brought on such change. The core propositions of Chapter 2 explore how and why such reactions are channeled in different ways by different subcultures.

To counter these simple materialist/production views, it is helpful to note that ethnographers have shown that some preliterate societies contribute their most treasured objects to religious worship, including art and dance. They interpenetrate all of our lives, if we look. How and why specific cultural patterns and priorities are defined, and how they shift, are pursued below.

Much of the excitement in this book came from discovering our independent convergence on amenities, consumption, and entertainment. But once Edward Glaeser, Richard Florida, Gary Gates, Bill Bishop, and I found each other and others with overlapping interests, we have actively exchanged papers, met at conferences, and helped arrange discussions on these issues. Some of the most dramatic sessions have been with groups who previously ignored or even opposed amenities in considering urban development and public policy.

Economists are often considered natural advocates of a materialist or economic interpretation, such as using capital and land to explain why cities grow or decline. But if this may fit many economists—as well as business magazine writers and the general public—a handful of economists have been leaders in analyzing amenities seriously. For some twenty years, a few economists have studied clean air, moderate temperatures, and other amenities, often gauging their impacts on land value, by comparing locations with more or fewer amenities. This method of “hedonic pricing” thus assigns a dollar value to such ostensibly nebulous things as clean air. Why economists? If these were art critics, few might be persuaded. But if even economists have come to stress amenities—as economists in general have not been professionally focused on beaches, clean air, and opera—then we may be onto factors that demand more attention, even by non-economists.

Consider two examples illustrating the recent but important recognition of the importance of entertainment and amenities. In the mid-1990s, the Chicago Federal Reserve Bank provided urban economic analyses of Midwestern cities. It reported twenty or so basic indicators, virtually all concerned with production and population change. I approached William Testa, Senior Economist at the Chicago Fed, and asked, how about consumption and amenities, like restaurants, shopping, tourists, or conventions? He came to one of our meetings, and the next year organized a conference at the Chicago Fed specifically on amenities. Some sixty persons attended, mainly economists. Edward Glaeser and I made presentations featuring amenities. A few speakers countered with strong “amenities are spurious” arguments, but as we saw examples mount, discussion shifted to support amenities. By the end of the day, roughly a third of the participants visibly accepted the importance of amenities, another third were opposed, and a third wavered. Not bad for a day’s work.

The second example is the Urban and Community Section of the American Sociological Association, some four hundred persons who communicate nearly daily on a listserve, a quasi-permanent email conference involving everyone who chooses to participate. I would guessestimate that until recently the majority view was that amenities were largely driven by economic factors, rather than vice versa, although many participants had probably not explored the matter. In the Fall of 2002, I circulated a draft of the chapter on Urban Amenities (Chapter 3). Several persons immediately criticized, even lampooned, it. Ray Hutchinson wrote: “Should cities offer Starbucks urban homesteading credits to locate in depressed neighborhoods so that these and other urban amenities can encourage yuppies to move into the area?” Debate ensued. By the second week the entire tone shifted, with even the most outspoken critics reversing themselves. The discussion mounted over the Fall, generating some one hundred pages of email, as people advanced all sorts of evidence, arguments, and counter arguments (Urban and Community Section of the American Sociological Association, Listserve, 2002). After three months, even self-declared Marxists accepted the visible importance of amenities for urban growth. Such shifts in this direction by notoriously skeptical and independent persons provide strong testimony to the importance of studying entertainment (see Chapter 8).
Several of us have been writing and discussing these themes in lectures and conferences around the country, but after Richard Florida’s book The Rise of The Creative Class came out in 2002, there was a huge increase in attention to related concerns. The book became a blockbuster, one of the best-selling non-fiction books in the U.S., and was discussed in lively sessions with mayors and civic leaders across the U.S., Canada, and various other countries. Themes from the book have helped focus innumerable conferences and professional association discussions, from the U.S. Conference of Mayors to high tech forums to the American Association for the Arts. The book advances arguments shared in several papers below, although there are enough controversial differences to spark debate. A core idea is that past theories of urban development stressed capital, then human capital, but did not ask what attracted human capital (i.e. talented people) to some cities more than others. Florida suggested that amenities mattered, as did tolerance—as registered by numerous gays residing in the area. But just what is tolerance?

MORALITY PLAYS: THE POLITICS OF IMAGINING PEOPLE AND GROUPS

We all do it. We label persons or groups as chic, funky, chauvinist, cool, Uncle Tom, nerdy, liberated, Baby Boomers, and more. Political and religious leaders similarly make moral statements, for instance by applying Biblical characters’ names to contemporaries like Bill Clinton or Saddam Hussein—as Satanic or a Good Samaritan. Muslims analogously invoke the Koran.

Social scientists debate social trends by inventing images and labels like bowling alone, racist, inner directed, or Third Way. To explore the impact of controversial individuals like Bill Clinton or Monica Lewinsky, many use labels that join them to deeper cultural divisions and conflicts. Consumption, long considered an area where brands and labels drive decisions, is becoming a critical focus of politics, nationally and in cities, complementing more traditional issues of production, work, and even taxes. Why is this so important? It signals a deeper transformation of politics away from the classic issues and resources exchanged in class politics and clientelism toward a New Political Culture—a major thesis developed elsewhere (e.g. Clark & Hoffmann-Martins, 1998). Citizens and the media rise to replace unions and parties, as new leaders succeed by redefining the rules of the game by which politics is played. Populist leaders invoke the legitimacy of the average citizen, and denigrate party leaders and traditional social and religious elites. The consumer/citizen is celebrated, along with aspects of the lives of average citizens like “human interest” stories in the press, TV “news,” and personal anecdotes unveiled in talk shows—which were previously beyond the pale of public focus or politics. Simultaneously, however, some persons counter these tendencies by attacking the excesses of individualist egalitarianism, and calling for a new moralism. The so-called “religious right” is the most visible example, and surveys suggest that some 20 percent of the U.S. public support a stricter code of public morality.

The chapters in this volume explore these issues in multiple contexts, using a variety of methods, evidence, and analyses. Rather than justifying our views by invoking grand theorists from the past, or assembling quotations from average persons, we often compare political systems that differ in how they operate, especially local governments. Why? Cities are ideal fruit flies to interpret bigger developments, as cities like Beverly Hills or Jerusalem change faster and illuminate extremes more completely than do national societies. These outlier cities, in addition to the Middletowns, can help chart and interpret complex processes—via case studies as well as statistical methods.

Others act politically in different consumption modes, for instance endorsing ecological concerns by not using plastic cups or not owning a car, but instead by recycling paper and using public transportation.

Still others participate in consumer boycotts, refusing to buy products like those made in South Africa under Apartheid or Nike shoes made in sweatshops. In 2002, the largest purchaser of beef and chicken in the world, the McDonalds Corporation, agreed with animal rights activists and required humane animal husbandry practices for all its suppliers—at costs estimated in the billions. These are all examples of politics interpenetrating consumption in ways that broadcast a strong moral and political message. Often these are carefully chosen or staged to leverage the act, usually via mass media, far more visibly than “normal” politics. Activists often start with what may seem to be a trivial issue, but by labeling it as a critical marker (e.g. a “non-negotiable demand”), it is powerfully elevated. It becomes a moral issue. This is particularly striking in locations like Southern Italy or much of Latin America, for instance, where traditionally morality and politics were considered totally separate. When President Jimmy Carter spoke about “human rights” in the 1970s, the European press and political leaders largely lampooned the issues as those of an American country bumpkin, unschooled in the cosmopolitan manners of world diplomacy—that is, power politics in the traditional sense. Indeed the entire sub-discipline of political science called IR, International Relations, even in the U.S., is only starting after the year 2000 to break with its long past—the “realism” doctrine of Hans Morgenthau and Henry Kissinger—to introduce non-military, non-economic, and non-geographic considerations. That is, to start to incorporate moral issues like human rights in “serious” analysis and policy advising.

Bowling Alone (Putnam, 2000) has sparked political debate globally. Why? Is not bowling a trivial consumption act? Precisely, Putnam replies, but adds that more Americans bow than join the Democratic or Republican parties. Yet why should a political scientist like Putnam care? A first answer is that not only are bowling leagues declining, so are unions and civic and organized groups, and voting in most countries. Much debate has focused on the type and magnitude of decline. But the second, deeper issue bowling alone raises is moral: does...
bowling alone, rather than supporting community bowling groups, signal moral decay? Debate here has focused on the decline of organizations as training grounds for civic leadership. As Tocqueville suggested, this was a key trait of popular democracy. "Social capital," Putnam holds, declines as groups shrink. (This led some critics like Skocpol et al., 2000, to counter that Putnam confused the dynamics of organizational membership; they instead stressed national processes like war and welfare state building as driving membership. Yet this criticism says almost nothing of culture and values.)

The deeper concern, the moral bite, the broader echos from Bowling Alone, I suggest, are not documenting declines in voting turnout or group membership. It is rather the moral degeneracy which they imply which is so provocative. Does their decline indicate that we are growing into more selfish individualists, driven by greed and markets rather than civic responsiveness to people around us? Is there less concern for the poor, since many civic groups have at least partially charitable concerns?

Bill Clinton, Tony Blair, and Gerhard Schroeder are similarly attacked as craven, nasty people, first since they abandoned the left programs of their parties and the poor, second since they were so politically successful in doing so, and third because they were inauthentic, morally uprooted, and blew wherever the wind took them.

Yet even in Clinton's darkest political hour, when the U.S. Congress held hearings to impeach him for his relations with aide Monica Lewinsky, Clinton's support with the U.S. public rose, at least as recorded in the standard public approval ratings (Clark, 2002). The visible public concern about hedonism and personal morality—as quintessentially illustrated by the Clinton impeachment effort—documents the deep divisions characterizing American society. Political battles in France and Turkey over whether Muslim women must or must not cover their heads, or concern with genetically engineered foods (mainly in Western Europe), illustrate the extent to which personal consumption issues have become openly and widely, if not globally, politicized. Debates flare precisely because "personal consumption," especially in entertainment, is a morally loaded act for some, yet for others is not at all. This signals the need for a deeper cultural analysis to interpret these differences in meaning of ostensibly similar behaviors.

The deeper point: bowling alone, McDonalds, animal rights, and recycling should be considered not as isolated and disparate issues. Rather they flow from deeper and more comprehensive cultural conflicts explored below. These issues are contemporary, but are also extensions of older patterns; it helps to dig back to unravel the present. The moral impact of these issues is broad because they flag concerns shared by many persons, increasingly around the globe.

They are part of a populist politics, which is bringing more issues increasingly to the average citizen for arbitration, at least symbolically. Ronald Reagan would regularly say "we have our people working on that issue" whereas Bill Clinton, Tony Blair, and others sought to explain and interpret major policies to the average citizen, heavily using the media.
In sum, to interpret many contemporary political processes, we need to dig deeper into consumption behavior and interpret its moral, cultural, and political meanings.

COMMENTS ON THEMES IN THE CHAPTERS BELOW

Chapter 2 by Terry Clark outlines an analytical framework for studying consumption and politics. It explores how consumption and political processes interpenetrate each other and have distinct coherence and meaning, if we look closely. For instance women shopping together may discuss clothing styles and personal scandals, which in turn link them to broader moral assessments, which may shift their support for political parties and leaders. Upper status American women voted Republican in the 1950s, but shifted to Democrats by the 1990s. Individual women gradually changed party allegiance over this period, as they made linkages between political candidates’ positions and many consumption and lifestyle issues, like women’s rights and abortion. This case illustrates a drastic shift in conceiving of politics. Europeans long saw strong parties and their official programs as the heart of political dynamics; citizens were expected to follow party lines. This often happened. But in recent years, parties and unions have declined as individual citizens, the media, and consumer issues have risen, initially in the U.S., later in Europe and much of the globe. Left and right are harder to define, and more often turn on consumption and lifestyle, rather than production and work issues. Women and households are more central public issues, as are issues like children’s and animal rights, women’s roles, abortion, gay marriage, proper labeling of food for its content, genetically modified food, and all aspects of the environment. These issues are less often party-driven, and more often considered by individuals or their “opinion leaders,” and are more “issue specific,” varying from one concern to another rather than consistently matching a Left or Right party program. Civic group leaders are less often immediate neighbors and more often linked via the telephone or internet or fax or email.

These changes in political culture do not appear everywhere evenly, but vary across subcultures and subregions. Three are stressed: the New England moralist tradition with its Calvinist Protestant roots, second, the individualist, from John Locke and Adam Smith, and third, traditional Southern and rural culture. The three provide contexts for general propositions about the effects of income, age, education, and the like—as stressed in most past work. Data are used from citizens surveyed in 3,111 U.S. counties merged with several other data sources to test selected propositions. Mini case studies that link to these broader issues are featured in boxes in several subsequent chapters.

Chapter 3, also by Terry Clark, focuses on urban amenities as driving urban development. Past studies stress human capital, plus the traditional factors of land, labor, capital, and management to explain urban development. This chapter reformulates these models by incorporating amenities and cultural concerns, to include explicit specification of where and how human capital locates itself. The chapter analyzes empirically how amenities differ for distinct population subgroups. Amenities include such natural amenities as climate, land topography, and access to water, while constructed amenities include opera, research libraries, used and rare bookstores, Starbucks coffee shops, juice bars, and bicycle events. Such amenities differentially attract distinct subgroups. For instance, the elderly move toward natural amenities, college graduates move toward constructed amenities, but creative persons (those who take out patents) move toward both. The main data are for 3,111 U.S. counties.

Edward Glaeser is a leading urban economist, and far more. Chapter 4 takes a fresh look at what cities do, by asking seriously how cities enhance consumption. Glaeser, Kolko and Saiz stress density as facilitating many urban amenities, such as increasing the speed with which one can access restaurants, museums, theaters and films, as well as marriage markets. And speed matters more as people grow more affluent and busy. They find that cities with such amenities have grown more quickly over the past twenty years both in the U.S. and in France. In cities with more educated populations, rents have gone up more quickly than wages since 1970—suggesting that quality of life has risen faster than productivity in places with more educated workers.

Throughout the book many chapters stress the shift in political culture toward amenities and consumption in recent years. How to capture and analyze such changes remains challenging. Anne Bartlett developed a new approach: analyzing website information. A particularly controversial case of shift in culture and policy was British government under Prime Minister Tony Blair. He came to power by redefining the Labour Party program into New Labour. He broke with the unions and the older party issues of labor/management conflict. Instead he appealed to a broader set of citizens, emphasizing amenities and lifestyle. But just where individual local governments stood on these issues was not clear. At outset he did not have clear control of the entire party, especially among local elected officials. Many local elections were staggered, so although he won in Parliament, many local officials had been elected in earlier years. Local autonomy thus heightened the implications of where each locality fell on these old versus new issues. While the British case is sharp, similar transitions have been underway worldwide which we have theorized about in this volume. How to capture them?

Anne Bartlett had the creative idea of reading reports posted on the websites of different British local governments. She downloaded reports from sixty-eight localities, and coded them in terms of the number of lines which emphasized old versus new types of themes. Then she analyzed how the emergence of these new themes meshed with changes in socio-economic makeup of the localities. Here she converged with earlier analysts of these issues who had used our FAUI surveys (see last section of chapter), and joined these with several projects generating fiscal and socio-economic data. The results show indeed that the
locations declining in jobs and population, older industrial locations, have more of the old Labor themes, while the New Political Culture emerges more clearly in growing, more affluent locations, with more highly educated residents. The results are generally consistent with the theory in this area—an unusual occurrence for hopeful researchers. This pioneering study opens the way to using globally accessible website materials for thematic analyses of culture and politics. The relatively inexpensive method encourages careful comparative analysis.

Richard Florida and Gary Gates present controversial ideas and results in Chapter 6, on “Technology and Tolerance,” which provocatively joins these two concepts. Past work on urban economic development stressed corporate location and job growth. The policy implication was that local governments should offer tax abatements, cheap land, and similar incentives to attract firms and jobs. Florida and Gates illustrate how this has changed by quoting Hewlett Packard CEO Carly Fiorina, who told a conference of governors: “Keep your tax incentives and highway interchanges, we will go where the highly skilled people are.” Her words are codified by economists who stress that “human capital” increasingly drives development. Florida and Gates take this a step further to ask what brings human capital to a city? Their main answer in this paper is tolerance. How measure tolerance? Here is their most controversial argument: gays flag tolerance. They use the Census to obtain the percent gay households in the fifty largest metro areas which they then correlate with levels and change in high tech jobs (such as the Milken index, one of the standard high tech measures of the proportion of jobs in high tech). They compute correlations and regressions which show that locations with more gays have more high tech growth, even controlling several other standard measures like population size. These findings are among those which have been the most challenging and heatedly discussed since Richard Florida published his book The Rise of the Creative Class in 2002. Public officials in locations like Detroit and its suburbs told the press that they were adopting policies to attract gays so as to help foster high tech growth.

Terry Clark explores this gay factor in Chapter 7, and finds, surprisingly, that it may be spurious. Reanalyzing the identical data that Gates and Florida used for the fifty largest U.S. metro areas, Clark finds that gays correlate very highly (r = 0.7) with percent college graduates, and it may be that the college graduates are more critical than gays. These results shift when the analysis is repeated for three hundred metro areas and then 3,111 counties; Results show minimal impacts of gays. Next individual citizen survey data are analyzed separately for the 3,111 counties to see if gays are associated with many value and attitudinal traits of locations as hypothesized. But we find that percent gay households are minimally related to tolerance, risk-taking, Asian immigrants, college faculty and students, or percent college graduates (unlike the fifty metro areas). Gays are slightly associated with amenities. Still, all these results about gays and growth are so new and preliminary that it is important for us and others to continue exploring just how they operate.

Chapter 9, Amenities Drive Urban Growth: Leadership and Policy Linkages by Terry Nichols Clark with Richard Lloyd, Kenneth K. Wong, and Pushpam Jain, first locates the shift toward amenities in the urban literature, and suggests how past thinking about urban development demands revision, given the salience of amenities and globalization. It next shows how leadership in U.S. cities has been transformed in the last decade or so, as new mayors have come to office, committed to the New Political Culture of consumption, citizen responsiveness, and efficient management. These patterns are summarized from surveys of all U.S. cities over twenty-five thousand (some 1,400), sketched for the seven largest cities, and explored in a case study of Chicago.

The Chicago case shows how committed political leadership and a firm management style dramatically transformed the schools and parks to make them more responsive to average and low-income citizens, despite battles with unions and contractors. Chicago is distinctly interesting in this regard precisely because it was not a Paris or Venice, but a blue-collar industrial city that drastically transformed itself in just a decade or so. There are many kinds of cities. Each requires polices matched to its circumstances. But Chicago has many lessons worth considering by other locations. The past traditions of open clientelism, initial public skepticism about amenities, and blue-collar political style make it resemble many other cities worldwide. Indeed Tokyo, Naples, and London are just among the most visible examples of cities pursuing many similar policies. The success of the policies we explore for Chicago makes them important for others to consider. Numerous policy specifics are thus detailed in the last sections of the chapter.

Since publishing the hardback edition of this volume, we have elaborated the idea of “scenes” as cluster of individual amenities. The scene, we suggest, emerges as distinctly salient in post-industrial societies where consumption specifics merge into production. For instance, restaurants attract more customers if they are embedded in a neighborhood filled with other appealing, related activities—as in a Chinatown or bohemian area like Greenwich Village. With the decline of primordial characteristics like race, class, gender, and national origin (they now explain only some 15 percent of items like civic activities), scenes rise. Which scenes? This depends on the preferences of the participants. How to map them? Thoughtful economists started working on amenities a few decades back, but they treated them atomistically for the most part: adding one or a few into their models, not seeking to match these to concepts like niche markets. Our innovation is to assemble hundreds of individual amenities and assign scores to them on fifteen more general dimensions: neighborliness, transgression, glamour, and more. These general dimensions are deep structures of scenes that can be recombined to create more specific types such as bohemia or Bobo.

Scenes analyses are currently in progress in the US, Canada, France, Korea, Japan, and China. The concluding chapter, by Clark, Daniel Silver and Clemente Navarro, provides an overview.
This volume thus suggests an agenda for future work in many areas of our social and political lives. We recommend more serious incorporation of amenities, lifestyle, and entertainment to capture key dynamics. Most past models in the social sciences have built on older processes, that often continue but are interpenetrated and complemented by culture, amenities, and entertainment. These new concerns can most obviously enter when persons choose where to live. People, especially talented persons who are key drivers of our modern societies, increasingly look for a location with the package of amenities they prefer—as well as a job. Jobs and leisure are more highly interpenetrated than in the past, making consumption more salient economically and politically. If we only analyze jobs and work, we misunderstand many key social and economic dynamics affecting our complex post-industrial, knowledge-driven societies. But selecting, implementing, and managing amenities is no simple task. It requires expensive and risky decisions. These can generate many conflicts, and they can fail—as can all policies. But like it or not, we are entering a new era where urban policy makers and policy analysts must incorporate amenity concerns into their choices if they are to keep abreast of our ever more global world.

**ORIGINAL DATA, MUCH NOW INTERNET ACCESSIBLE**

A recent stimulus for more general theorizing derives from the synergy of recently combining multiple new data sources. These permit analyzing individual citizens in their cultural and social contexts more powerfully than ever before. For persons in the future to reassess or improve on hypotheses throughout this volume, it is critical to access some of these sorts of data. The data have been assembled over several decades by investing many millions of dollars. Most are now available free of charge over the internet. Sources:

- The Fiscal Austerity and Urban Innovation Project, which now has original survey data from local officials plus official data from some ten thousand localities in twenty-five countries. Some six hundred variables come from original surveys, such as mayor and council spending preferences, and organized group activities and impact. The DDB Life Style Survey, a national survey of some eighty-eight thousand U.S. citizens from 1975 to the late 1990s, collected for marketing and long kept private. It has recently become publicly available and includes county identifiers, thus permitting local contextual analysis by merging with other local-area data. It has some seven hundred variables like how much do you volunteer time, eat out, and go to church, as well as “The car I drive is a reflection of who I am . . .

(agree/disagree).” This is the first study we know of that analyzes DDB local variations.

- The PEW Tracking surveys of U.S. citizens are distinctly attuned to new political and civic developments. They address concerns like the Internet and its use, political contacts, sources of media information, and more.

- The World Values Surveys which from 1980 to present have grown to include over 100,000 citizens in over fifty countries.

- New variables and data, like the percent gays and unmarried households in a U.S. locality, amenity measures like museums and juice bars, a Bohemian index of distinct occupations, patents, and high tech growth (as considered in chapters by Gates and Florida, Glaeser and Clark). These help capture issues emerging with post-industrial society, where citizens and consumption are increasingly central.

- The quantitative sources above are complemented by an ethnography and oral history of Chicago in the last half of the twentieth century, which explores the same themes which we link: to past ethnographies and case studies. Chapter 8 draws on a longer work (book manuscript and original interviews are available) Title: *Trees and Real Violins: Building Post-Industrial Chicago. An Oral History from Mayors Daley I to Daley II.*

Most data are being made publicly available over the internet (esp. via [http://www.src.uchicago.edu/depts/faui/archive.html or tnclark@uchicago.edu](http://www.src.uchicago.edu/depts/faui/archive.html or tnclark@uchicago.edu)).

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